Here is a funny radio segment from a South African morning radio program, as they call the (fictitious) answering service at the Embassy of Zimbabwe. (from Chris Blattman's Blog)
Here is an analysis of votes made by Senators Clinton and Obama in the US Senate: both are left-of-center, almost identical, and mainstream for the democratic party. (thanks to Kids Prefer Cheese)
Showing posts with label PSC442 International Conflict Spring 2008. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PSC442 International Conflict Spring 2008. Show all posts
Tuesday, April 22, 2008
Thursday, April 17, 2008
Cheating in the Russian Elections
Here is a link to an analysis of possible Russian election fraud. Interesting analysis and interesting ramifications, if true...
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Project #2
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
Another argument for free trade?
Here is a description of a report on the decline of burglaries in the US. Note the relationship between price and crime; note also the effects of price increases on goods versus services.
Interim and Summer Class Schedule Adverts
If you're interested in studying the causes and effects of international conflict in the Middle East, then check out my Interim class.
I'll also be teaching the International Relations intro (PSC204) and American Foreign Policy (PSC413) during Summer II. Check out the syllabi for all these courses here.
I'll also be teaching the International Relations intro (PSC204) and American Foreign Policy (PSC413) during Summer II. Check out the syllabi for all these courses here.
Speaker from the US State Department
Meet U.S. State Department
Foreign Service Officer
Greg Morrison
A native of Alabama
Thursday, March 27 at 4:00p.m.
Ferguson Forum Room (Rm. 360)
Mr. Morrison’s recent postings have been in Armenia and Syria
Bring your questions!
Sponsored by the International Honors Program
and Capstone International
and Capstone International
Thursday, March 06, 2008
Tuesday, March 04, 2008
Summary Statistics for Exam 1
The results are in for the first exam, and here are some brief summary statistics:
Total Number of Exams: 48
Mean score: 79.68
Range: 57.5 to 95.1 (the full description is below)
CURVE: There is no curve for this test.
. tab test1
test1 | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
57.55% | 1 2.08 2.08
65.60% | 1 2.08 4.17
65.80% | 1 2.08 6.25
68.25% | 1 2.08 8.33
68.60% | 1 2.08 10.42
68.85% | 1 2.08 12.50
69.55% | 1 2.08 14.58
71.75% | 1 2.08 16.67
72.50% | 1 2.08 18.75
73.80% | 1 2.08 20.83
74.50% | 1 2.08 22.92
74.60% | 1 2.08 25.00
76.05% | 2 4.17 29.17
76.60% | 1 2.08 31.25
77.05% | 1 2.08 33.33
77.10% | 1 2.08 35.42
77.55% | 2 4.17 39.58
78.50% | 1 2.08 41.67
78.85% | 1 2.08 43.75
79.05% | 1 2.08 45.83
79.50% | 2 4.17 50.00
79.60% | 1 2.08 52.08
79.80% | 1 2.08 54.17
80.30% | 1 2.08 56.25
81.05% | 2 4.17 60.42
81.30% | 1 2.08 62.50
82.00% | 1 2.08 64.58
82.25% | 1 2.08 66.67
82.50% | 1 2.08 68.75
83.00% | 1 2.08 70.83
83.05% | 1 2.08 72.92
85.35% | 1 2.08 75.00
86.10% | 1 2.08 77.08
86.60% | 1 2.08 79.17
88.05% | 1 2.08 81.25
88.60% | 1 2.08 83.33
89.30% | 2 4.17 87.50
89.60% | 1 2.08 89.58
89.75% | 1 2.08 91.67
91.75% | 1 2.08 93.75
92.05% | 1 2.08 95.83
92.50% | 1 2.08 97.92
95.10% | 1 2.08 100.00
Total Number of Exams: 48
Mean score: 79.68
Range: 57.5 to 95.1 (the full description is below)
CURVE: There is no curve for this test.
. tab test1
test1 | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
57.55% | 1 2.08 2.08
65.60% | 1 2.08 4.17
65.80% | 1 2.08 6.25
68.25% | 1 2.08 8.33
68.60% | 1 2.08 10.42
68.85% | 1 2.08 12.50
69.55% | 1 2.08 14.58
71.75% | 1 2.08 16.67
72.50% | 1 2.08 18.75
73.80% | 1 2.08 20.83
74.50% | 1 2.08 22.92
74.60% | 1 2.08 25.00
76.05% | 2 4.17 29.17
76.60% | 1 2.08 31.25
77.05% | 1 2.08 33.33
77.10% | 1 2.08 35.42
77.55% | 2 4.17 39.58
78.50% | 1 2.08 41.67
78.85% | 1 2.08 43.75
79.05% | 1 2.08 45.83
79.50% | 2 4.17 50.00
79.60% | 1 2.08 52.08
79.80% | 1 2.08 54.17
80.30% | 1 2.08 56.25
81.05% | 2 4.17 60.42
81.30% | 1 2.08 62.50
82.00% | 1 2.08 64.58
82.25% | 1 2.08 66.67
82.50% | 1 2.08 68.75
83.00% | 1 2.08 70.83
83.05% | 1 2.08 72.92
85.35% | 1 2.08 75.00
86.10% | 1 2.08 77.08
86.60% | 1 2.08 79.17
88.05% | 1 2.08 81.25
88.60% | 1 2.08 83.33
89.30% | 2 4.17 87.50
89.60% | 1 2.08 89.58
89.75% | 1 2.08 91.67
91.75% | 1 2.08 93.75
92.05% | 1 2.08 95.83
92.50% | 1 2.08 97.92
95.10% | 1 2.08 100.00
Random Posts of the Day
First, in lighter news, check out these maps of the relationship between Walmarts and Starbucks. How do you explain the negative correlation?
Second, and probably more appropriate for this class, here and here are some stories about the border clashes between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Here is a story about the recent Turkish rout of PKK forces in Iraq.
Second, and probably more appropriate for this class, here and here are some stories about the border clashes between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Here is a story about the recent Turkish rout of PKK forces in Iraq.
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Interesting GDP data...
Note the differences between what country people in the US think is #1 and what country actually is #1.
Tuesday, February 19, 2008
New Freedom House Data -- 2007 was not a good year...
Here is a description of the 2007 Freedom House data rating the level of democracy in countries around the world. Apparently, 2007 was not a very good year for the advancement of democracy.
Perhaps things will change with Castro stepping down?
Here is a summary quote from the report:
Perhaps things will change with Castro stepping down?
Here is a summary quote from the report:
The year 2007 was marked by a notable setback for global freedom. The decline, which was reflected in reversals in one-fifth of the world’s countries, was most pronounced in South Asia, but also reached significant levels in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. It affected a substantial number of large and politically important countries—including Russia, Pakistan, Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria, and Venezuela—whose declines have wider regional and global implications. Other countries experienced reversals after a period of progress toward democracy, including pivotal states in the Arab Middle East. While many more countries suffered declines than registered improvements, the degree of change reflected in some countries was modest while in others the decline was more substantial. …[The] results for 2007 marked the second consecutive year in which the survey registered a decline in freedom, representing the first two-year setback in the past 15 years. In all, nearly four times as many countries showed significant declines during the year as registered improvements.
Class Notes - Steps to War Model
Here are the notes for today's class.
Remember: 1) Test this Thursday; 2) Bibliography for project next Thursday.
Remember: 1) Test this Thursday; 2) Bibliography for project next Thursday.
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
The effects of a decentralized al-Qa'ida
So why does the US often report that "high level al-Qa'ida operatives" have been killed or captured? How many are there?
This article in US News on the decentralizaed structure of terrorist organizations, al-Qa'ida in particular, has been mentioned quite a bit (see here and here for example). The Monkey Cage builds on this article and points to the academic research behind the argument-- for example, a recent International Studies Quarterly article by Shaprio and Siegel which argues:
The puzzle for traditional perspectives on terrorist financial and logistical systems is that groups, which are purportedly organized to carry out attacks often provide inadequate funds to their operatives. … suppose that the members of a terrorist support network, middlemen, were not uniformly driven by mission accomplishment, but that some were driven by monetary rewards.
According to Shapiro's other work, al-Qa'ida has often been concerned with management issues. However, after the forced decentralization of the hierarchical structure in late 2002, monitoring of terrorist agents became problematic:
From the mid-1990s through late-2001, al-Qa’ida made every effort to become a fully bureaucratized organization, complete with employment contracts specifying vacation policies, explicitly documented roles and responsibilities for different jobs including detailed descriptions of the experiences required for senior leadership roles, security memos written by a specialized security committee,14 and standardized questionnares for those arriving at training camps. Al-Qa’ida did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key al-Qa’ida leaders … In response these and other key losses, al-Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council decided that it could no longer operate as a hierarchy, but instead would have to decentralize. Essentially, al-Qa’ida traded operational control and financial efficiencies for security and organizational survival.
So what does all this mean for the US ability to capture top operatives? As Henry Farrell points out:
Skeptics, ditch-hurlers and finger-pointers have suggested that the US may have slightly exaggerated the importance of these kills, going so far as to draw rather unkind comparisons between the life prospects (a) of someone appointed to the position of third-in-command in al-Qaeda, and (b) of someone appointed as drummer in Spinal Tap. But a less cynical take is possible. Perhaps, given the problems outlined above, Al-Qaeda (new model) needs lots and lots of executive vice-presidents for financial control and auditing to try to keep track of what their various subcontractors are up to.
This article in US News on the decentralizaed structure of terrorist organizations, al-Qa'ida in particular, has been mentioned quite a bit (see here and here for example). The Monkey Cage builds on this article and points to the academic research behind the argument-- for example, a recent International Studies Quarterly article by Shaprio and Siegel which argues:
The puzzle for traditional perspectives on terrorist financial and logistical systems is that groups, which are purportedly organized to carry out attacks often provide inadequate funds to their operatives. … suppose that the members of a terrorist support network, middlemen, were not uniformly driven by mission accomplishment, but that some were driven by monetary rewards.
According to Shapiro's other work, al-Qa'ida has often been concerned with management issues. However, after the forced decentralization of the hierarchical structure in late 2002, monitoring of terrorist agents became problematic:
From the mid-1990s through late-2001, al-Qa’ida made every effort to become a fully bureaucratized organization, complete with employment contracts specifying vacation policies, explicitly documented roles and responsibilities for different jobs including detailed descriptions of the experiences required for senior leadership roles, security memos written by a specialized security committee,14 and standardized questionnares for those arriving at training camps. Al-Qa’ida did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key al-Qa’ida leaders … In response these and other key losses, al-Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council decided that it could no longer operate as a hierarchy, but instead would have to decentralize. Essentially, al-Qa’ida traded operational control and financial efficiencies for security and organizational survival.
So what does all this mean for the US ability to capture top operatives? As Henry Farrell points out:
Skeptics, ditch-hurlers and finger-pointers have suggested that the US may have slightly exaggerated the importance of these kills, going so far as to draw rather unkind comparisons between the life prospects (a) of someone appointed to the position of third-in-command in al-Qaeda, and (b) of someone appointed as drummer in Spinal Tap. But a less cynical take is possible. Perhaps, given the problems outlined above, Al-Qaeda (new model) needs lots and lots of executive vice-presidents for financial control and auditing to try to keep track of what their various subcontractors are up to.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)