Additional Readings (and links!) for PS413/513 American Foreign Policy

Additional Readings for PS413/513 American Foreign Policy

For each article below, I have posted a link to an online source that provides the content of the article or the scan. Note that for most of these links, you will have to be on campus or have proxy access (see the library's help page) to read the articles from your computer.

Michalak, Stanley, “Worldviews and the Analysis of Foreign Policy”, Chapter 1 in Competing Conceptions of American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 1991.

Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." American Political Science Review. 63 (1969) 689-718.

Gaddis, J. L. “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System.” International Security, Spring, 1986, Vol. 10, No. 4

Mueller, John, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World.” International Security, Fall, 1988, Vol. 13(2)

Jervis, Robert, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons.” International Security, Fall, 1988, Vol. 13, No. 2

Mearsheimer, John, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.” International Security, Summer 1990, Vol. 15, No. 1.

Wayman, F.W., “Bipolarity and War.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1984), pp. 61-78.

Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox. “Clash of civilizations, or realism and liberalism deja vu? Some evidence.” Journal of Peace Research. Sept 2000 v37 i5 p583

Huntington, Samuel P. “Try again: a reply to Russett, Oneal and Cox.” Journal of Peace Research Sept 2000 v37 i5 p609

Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett. “A response to Huntington.” Journal of Peace Research. Sept 2000 v37 i5 p611

Press, Daryl G., "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," International Security. 26:2 (Fall 2001), 5–44

Posen, Barry R. “Military responses to refugee disasters,” International Security. Summer 1996 v21 n1

Pape, Robert, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 August 2003: 1-19.

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, “Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror." International Organization 61(1).

Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97(1):75-90.

Fearon, James. “Why do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?” Journal of Peace Research

Vasquez, John, 1995. “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Territoriality, Proximity, or Interactions.” Journal of Peace Research 32 (August): 277-293,

Douglas M. Gibler. 2007. Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict. International Studies Quarterly.

Marc Hutchison and D. M. Gibler. 2007. Political Tolerance and Territorial Threat: A Cross-National Study, Journal of Politics.

Huntington, Samuel, “Why International Primacy Matters.” International Security, Spring 1993, Vol. 17, No. 4.

Jervis, Robert, “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle.” International Security, Spring 1993, Vol. 17, No. 4.

Gholz, Eugene et al., “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation.” International Security, Spring 1997, 21(4)

Syllabus for PS413/513 American Foreign Policy

Here is the syllabus for my American Foreign Policy class, Spring 2007.

Final Exam

Final Exam for Ps 442/542 International Conflict
Fall 2006

DIRECTIONS: This final exam is take-home. Students are allowed to consult their notes and textbooks, but no other sources may be consulted. These are independent papers. Each student is expected to do their own work and may not consult with other students during the writing of the exam. Students should take care to cite evidence from the textbooks and their class notes. All responses are to be typed, double-spaced, with 12 point, normal font. Complete, concise, and coherent answers are expected.

NOTE: Final exams are due by Friday, December 15^th, at 11:30am in Prof. Gibler’s mailbox on the political science floor. Emailed exams will not be accepted.

Part I: Three questions (60 total points)

1.) Describe the Kantian tripod developed in Russett and Oneal’s Triangulating Peace. What evidence do they provide to support their arguments? Are the theory and evidence convincing? Why or why not?

2.) Describe the territorial explanation of conflict developed by Vasquez in The War Puzzle. What evidence does he provide to support his overall argument? Are the theory and evidence convincing? Why or why not?

3.) How do international power politics behaviors affect domestic processes and institutions? Use three examples of power politics behaviors and describe how these behaviors affect internal state institutions and/or political processes. Why is understanding the domestic level effects of international politics so important?

Part II: One question (40 points)

The Great Kingdom of Ishmaelia rests on a narrow, disputed border with Azania, its only neighbor. The President of Azania, Yogi Tuttle, heads a newly formed, democratically governed state and wishes to resolve the disputed border. However, Ishmaelia continues to stall on the negotiations. In fact, King Feral, who has ruled Ishmaelia for more than 50 years, has sought the outside aid of two powerful states in the hopes of deterring Azania. This new “Triple Alliance of the Obscenely Powerful” is a defense pact, and Ishmaelia can definitely be considered a minor state protégé of the other two states. President Tuttle, fearing reprisals at home, has begun a concerted effort to improve the military capabilities of his state, including the introduction of a military draft and a dramatic (7%) increase in weapons expenditures. This in turn has caused King Feral to move his troops to the border. Unfortunately, this entire situation reminds all watchers of the past two crises – now almost 50 years old – in which both states came so close to war.

It is not a good time for this dispute to be occurring. The world has been divided into two hostile blocs by some permanent alliances between the major states, but none of these major states have had enough capabilities to truly dominate the world system. Whatever intergovernmental organizations still remain have proven relatively ineffectual due to the numerous divisions among the major states, and numerous developing crises continue to divide the attention of the overworked heads of state.

It is into this situation that you now enter. You have been asked to independently assess the possibilities of war given the above scenario. If war is likely, you are to present evidence as to why it is likely, and how big and severe it is likely to be. Use all of the evidence you have learned this semester, and be sure not to shy away from citing every reading on the syllabus with SPECIFIC findings. Good luck.

Final Exam

Final Exam Questions for PS321 Democratization
Fall 2006

DIRECTIONS: This final exam is take-home. Students are allowed to consult their notes and textbooks, but no other sources may be consulted. These are independent papers. Each student is expected to do their own work and may not consult with other students during the writing of the exam. Students should take care to cite evidence from the textbooks and their class notes. All responses are to be typed, double-spaced, with 12 point, normal font. Complete, concise, and coherent answers are expected.

NOTE: Final exams are due by Tuesday, December 12^th, at 11:30am in Prof. Gibler’s mailbox on the political science floor.

Part I: Three questions (60 total points)

1.) What effects does asset specificity have on the likelihood of democratic transitions? Does it affect the type of transition? In your answer, be sure to trace through the process of democratization as it relates to asset specificity. Be precise in your answer.

2.) What regional forces have had an effect on democratization over the past 50+ years? Incorporate the discussions of specific countries from the group projects in your answers. Also, contrast these forces with the theory and analyses presented in Enteriline and Greig. (Both the group presentations and the paper by Enterline and Greig are available on the class blog.)

3.) What effects does external, territorial threat have on the likelihood of democratic transitions? In your answer, be sure to trace through the process of democratization as it relates to external, territorial threat. Be as specific as possible on how threat affects domestic politics and institutions. Students might also think about how to incorporate Boix’s work in their explanation.

Part II: One question (40 points)

Differentiate between Gleditsch’s (2002) integration theory of democratization and the theory of transitions based on territorial threat. Summarize Gleditsch’s argument and analyses, and then contrast that summary to the arguments given in Part I, Question #3 above. Who is right? What evidence do you have to come to this conclusion?

Priorities!

Here is a surreal story about the backdrop for a possible coup attempt in Fiji. Note especially the first sentence.

UPDATE (12/4): It looks like the rugby game is over.